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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we study two manufacturers, each producing a single substituting product, selling 
the products through their own centralized distribution channels, and also using each other’s 
distribution channel at their choice. Distribution channels are also substitutable. Using price 
competition and a game theoretic approach, we find that the same products can be sold at a 
higher price in the cross-sale channel than in its own centralized distribution channel.  The first 
mover in doing a cross-sale doesn’t necessarily enjoy the advantage in terms of higher profit.  Not 
only manufacturers can charge higher prices for their own and cross-sold product from their 
competitor, but also cross-sale increases the profits of both manufacturers; and most importantly, 
cross-sale improves the system’s profit dramatically. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n practice, businesses define cross-sale in many different ways. In supply chain system, cross-sale is 
usually defined as selling products through different distribution channels and is commonly observed in 
practice. For example, Dell sells its products through its own centralized distribution channel (dell.com) 
and also through other channels, like BestBuy, Wal-Mart (walmart.com), etc. On the other hand, Dell also sells its 
competitors’ products in its centralized channel. For example, Dell not only sells its brand name, but also sells 
Canon, Epson, Kodak, Lexmark, etc. 
 
Depending upon the manufacturer’s decision, three different channel structures may rise - exclusive system 
(where both manufacturers sell their products exclusively through their own centralized systems), partially cross-
sale system (where one manufacturer sells in both channels and the other sells only in its centralized channel), and 
complete cross-sale system (where both manufacturers sell products in both parties’ channels). We use price 
competition and a game theoretic approach to model the above framework. This paper is intended to answer the 
following questions:  “Is it always beneficial to have cross-sale in terms of charging higher prices and obtaining 
more profit?” and “How do product substitutability and channel substitutability affect a cross-sale decision?” 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
One stream of literature is about supply chain system (in)efficiency, channel conflict, and mechanism to 
achieve coordination. A comprehensive review of this stream is provided by Cachon (2003). This stream typically 
considers a single manufacturer selling identical products through different channels; for example, exclusive retailer, 
internet, or a hybrid channel. Ahn et al. (2002) study the competition between decentralized retailers and 
manufacturer’s centralized distribution channel under price competition. Chiang (2003) finds that a single 
manufacturer may sell the product through direct channel to alleviate the double marginalization observed in the 
decentralized retail channel. Tsay and Agarwal (2004) review the modeling of channel conflict and coordination. 
Our work focuses on cross-sale between channels instead of coordination and considers two manufacturers selling 
substitutable products through integrated distribution channels.  
 
 
I 
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The two-manufacturer/two-distribution channel system has been studied by marketing and operations 
literature from different perspectives. Two distribution channels can be either centralized (owned by the 
manufacturers) or decentralized (owned by independent retailers). McGuire and Staelin (1983) study the impact of 
product substitutability on Nash equilibrium channel configurations and they further extend their research by 
incorporating quantity discount and various cost structures into their model (1986). Cachon et al. (2008) and Chiou 
(2009) address the effect of large product variety on consumers and retailer.  Also, many researchers are interested 
in how vertical competition strategies affect channel performance under various pricing strategies in a decentralized 
supply chain system, like Moorthy (1987, 1988), Gupta and Loulou (1998), and Lee and Staelin (1997).  Cross-sale 
does not occur in any of these papers. 
 
Within the framework of exogenous channel configurations and multiple retailers, Choi (1996) studies 
price competition under product and retailer differentiations for different decentralized channel configurations. 
Moner-Colonques el al. (2004) find that retailer differentiation drives cross-sale under price competition in a 
decentralized channel system, but there will be no cross-sale if retail store differentiation is not observed in the 
above two articles. Our work studies whether cross-sale is a beneficial strategy for centralized manufacturers.  
 
MODEL 
 
Consider two substitutable products, denoted by 1 and 2, produced by two manufacturers. The two 
manufacturers, denoted by    and    each have their own centralized distribution channels, denoted by    and   , 
respectively. Each product is certainly sold through the manufacturer’s centralized system and may also be sold 
through the other manufacturer’s distribution channel.  The two channels are also substitutable. Product 
substitutability and channel substitutability create different competition dimensions. One dimension of competition 
is introduced by considering cross-sale decision between different channels, while the other dimension of 
competition is introduced by substitutable products. Several multi-channel distribution systems are considered.  
 
Figure 1 schematically describes these configurations. The exclusive system (denoted by E) is a fully 
integrated system where each manufacturer produces its own product and sells it through a centralized channel. It 
serves as a benchmark for the cross-sale systems. The partial cross-sale system (denoted by PC) involves one 
manufacturer who produces and sells its product (product 1) through its own centralized channel exclusively, while 
the second manufacturer produces and sells its product (product 2) through both its own centralized channel and the 
retailing channel owned by the first manufacturer. The first manufacturer makes stocking decisions of product 2 sold 
in its channel. Certainly in this configuration, the positions of manufacturers are interchangeable. The complete 
cross-sale system (denoted by C) involves both manufacturers selling their products not only through their own 
integrated channel,but also through the competitor’s channel, in which both manufacturers make stocking decisions 
of each other’s product sold in their channels serving their own interests.  
 
Without loss of generality, we assume the common marginal production cost for each product is 0, no fixed 
cost of production is considered, and that the production and delivery are assumed to be instantaneous. One 
manufacturer produces as the other manufacturer’s order under a wholesale price contract when cross-sale occurs. 
Let    and    be the wholesale prices of products 1 and 2. Manufacturer 1 not only sets the retail price of its own 
product, product 1, sold through its own channel, denoted by   ,but also the retail price of manufacturer 2’s product, 
product 2, denoted by    , when it is sold through       integrated channel. Similarly, manufacturer 2 sets the retail 
price of product 2 sold in its own channel, denoted by   , and the retail price of product 1, denoted by    , when it is 
sold through  ’s integrated channel.  
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Figure 1:  Cross-Sale Distribution System Configurations 
 
 
The competition is modeled by the following demand functions when there is no cross-sale.  
 
                                        (1) 
 
where         , is the demand for product  ,   denotes channel substitution, and   denotes product substitution.  
 
In particular, the products are perfectly differentiated when      . The products are nearly identical as 
    approaches infinity. This type of demand function is standard in economics and marketing literature modeling 
product substitutability (Gal-Or, 1991; Raju et al., 1995). Moreover, Lee and Staelin (2000) show that a linear 
demand function involving substitutable products is indeed consistent with reasonable buyer behavior and market 
characteristics.  
 
   
 
 is used to denote the profit of manufacturer    for a specific configuration  , where       and   E,  C, C. 
The total supply chain profit (the sum of the profits of manufacturers) under configuration   will be denoted by    
(no subscripts). 
 
The exclusive system serves as a benchmark for the cross-sale systems. The profit maximization problem 
of   is 
 
                          , where              
 
The solution of the above optimization problem yields the following results.  
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For the reason of brevity, between partial cross-sale system (PC) and complete cross-sale system (C), only 
C is described here. PC will have similar formulations.  
 
Under a cross-sale system, both manufacturers sell their products through both their own integrated channel 
and the competitor’s channel.    sets the whole sale price    for    to buy product   and sell it in its channel.    
sets the retail price of product  , denoted by    . So the demand function (1) is extended to  
 
                                          
 
                                        , 
 
                                            , 
 
and                                               
 
where    is the demand for product   sold in  ’s channel,      is the demand of product   in   ’s channel, and    
and     are the prices of the same product   sold in different channels (            .  
 
The profit maximization problem of manufacturer   is  
 
   
                          
 
Where               
 
The first order conditions (it is easy to verify that the second order conditions are satisfied) yield:  
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and then  
 
  
                                 
 
   
                                         
 
The two manufacturers select their wholesale prices by solving the following problems 
 
   
  
   
                         
 
The equilibrium wholesale prices   
  and   
  can be found by solving the 1
st
 order conditions. Once   
  and 
  
  are known, the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits, as well as the total profit, can be calculated 
accordingly. The whole sale prices, retail prices, order quantities, and manufacturer’s profits are symmetric with 
respect to the two products. This is because of the assumption of symmetric cost structure for the two products. This 
assumption is not critical to our model; rather, it allows us to compare and contrast different systems elegantly. 
Similarly, we can solve for the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits of partial cross-sale system (PC). All of 
these results can be obtained easily through using Maple or Matlab, but the structures of the results are lengthy. So, 
for the sake of brevity, we don’t list them here. 
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RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
Theorem 1 
 
At equilibrium, the following relationships hold,  
 
(a)   
    
     
 ,    
    
  and   
     
 ; 
 
(b)    
     
  ,    
    
  and     
    
 . 
 
 
This theorem captures both the vertical and horizontal changes in prices due to cross-sale.  
 
Part (a) of the theorem states that comparing the retail prices of the three supply chain systems, cross-sale 
systems allow manufacturers to charge higher retail prices. The retail prices of products 1 and 2 in their own 
channels are higher in partial cross-sale system than in exclusive system, also higher in complete cross-sale system 
than in exclusive system.  So when we compare configurations of different degrees of cross-sale, we find cross-sale 
is beneficial in terms of “providing” higher retail prices. 
 
Both     and    are the retail prices of product 2. The former is the cross-sale price in manufacturer 1’s 
channel and the latter is the price in its own channel.      and    are also the retail prices of the same product, 
product 1, but in different distribution channels. Part (b) of the theorem states that within the same cross-sale 
systems, the same products can be sold at a higher price in the cross-sale channel than in its own centralized 
distribution channel. This is counter intuitive in the sense that people would think the prices would go down in the 
cross-sale channel due to more direct competition from the rival.  
 
Theorem 2 
 
At equilibrium, the following relationships hold, 
 
(a)    
      
    
 
(b)    
     
      
  and    
     
      
  . 
 
This theorem has important implications. Part (a) states that the first mover in doing cross-sale doesn’t 
necessarily enjoy an advantage in terms of higher profit when only partial cross-sale occurs. The result depends on 
the degree of product and channel substitutions.  
 
Part (b) says that not only manufacturers can charge higher prices for their own and cross-sold product 
from their competitor, but also cross-sale does increase the profits of both manufacturers.  
 
Theorem 3 
 
   
  
,  
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  are all increasing functions of both   and  . 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the idea of Theorem 3. Since   and   are both greater than 0,  
   
  
,  
  
  
, and 
  
   
  achieve 
their minimums when       and the minimums are 137.5%, 175%, and 127.27%, respectively.  
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Figure 2:  Comparison Among Different Systems 
 
 
 Hence, partial cross-sale can improve the system profit by at least 37.5% and cross-sale can improve the 
system profit by at least 75% compared to no cross-sale at all. Even from partial cross-sale system to full cross-sale 
system, the total system profit can be further improved by at least 27.27%; so cross-sale does improve the system 
profit dramatically.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Cross-sale in the supply chain distribution system is often observed in practice. In this paper, we use price 
competition and game theoretic approach to model duopoly centralized distribution systems where two 
manufacturers, each producing a single substituting product, sell the products through their own centralized 
distribution channels and may also use each other’s distribution channel at their choice. 
 
We found that the same products can be sold at a higher price in the cross-sale channel than in its own 
centralized distribution channel and that the first mover in doing cross-sale doesn’t necessarily en oy an advantage 
in terms of higher profit. The result depends on the degree of product and channel substitutions.  Not only 
manufacturers can charge higher prices for their own and cross-sold product from their competitor, but also cross-
sale does increase the profits of both manufacturers; and, most importantly, cross-sale does improve the system 
profit dramatically for both partial cross-sale and complete cross-sale distribution systems. 
 
Like all other models in marketing or operations literature, our model is not free from assumptions. We 
assume a zero production cost demand. This allows us to get analytically tractable results and derive interesting 
insights.  Similar assumption has often been made in a lot of literature. Our assumption about the structure of the 
demand function is also standard in economics, operations, and marketing literature.  We consider only a dual-
channel centralized distribution system involving two substitutable products.  A natural extension is to study a 
decentralized distribution system involving two manufacturers and two retail outlets which are more commonly 
observed in reality. Another possible direction of future research is to introduce demand uncertainty into our model. 
Our model assumes complete information and is symmetric. Relaxing these assumptions can also provide potentially 
interesting extensions.  
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